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Abstract 
 
Open innovation initiatives are useful to acquire 
many ideas, but often face problems when it comes to 
selecting the best ideas. Idea convergence has been 
suggested as a first step in idea selection to filter those 
ideas that are worthy of further consideration. Digital 
nudges – digital interventions that aim at altering 
human behavior in a predictable way - could support 
convergence. However, their effects are largely 
unknown. This study explores how two digital nudges, 
selection strategy (inclusion/exclusion) and idea subset 
similarity (similar/random), affect the convergence 
outcomes consideration set size and perceived cognitive 
effort. We conducted a laboratory experiment with 88 
students and found that guiding individuals towards an 
inclusion strategy results in smaller consideration sets 
and higher perceived cognitive effort. Moreover, 
presenting individuals with subsets of similar ideas 
resulted in smaller consideration sets. These insights 
are relevant for the design and use of digital nudges for 
convergence in open innovation environments. 
 
  
 
1. Introduction  
 
Organizations increasingly employ crowds to 
enhance their innovation processes, which has been 
termed open innovation (OI) [1]. Innovation contests are 
one form of OI initiatives, in which a crowd generates 
hundreds or thousands of ideas from which only a few 
will be selected as the best ideas [2]. Research has 
established extensive insights and knowledge into the 
idea creation process, but has not yet developed 
sufficient understanding to explain the idiosyncrasies of 
idea selection processes [3].  
                                                            
1 https://blog.hypeinnovation.com/product/pairwise-evaluation-
innovation-platform-hype-enterprise 
During idea selection, a small team usually first 
converges on the 10 to 40 most promising ideas within 
a few days or weeks followed by a jury with high 
domain expertise that determines the winning idea(s) 
[4], [5]. Organizations struggle with adopting 
appropriate convergence procedures when facing large 
pools of generated ideas [5]. More and more 
organizations attempt to outsource this process to the 
crowd [2]. However, individual crowd raters are limited 
in their ability to select the best ideas [3]. They 
experience high levels of cognitive load [6] and are 
influenced by cognitive biases [7], because of the often 
number of ideas they need to process [4] and limited 
knowledge of how the idea came about [3], [8].  
Idea selection is not new, but developments in 
technology provide new capabilities that continuously 
alter the way how individuals make their choices [9]. 
For example, the innovation platform Hype1 
incorporates amongst others a pairwise comparison 
feature for ideas so that raters can more easily select 
those ideas that perform well according to specific 
quality criteria. 
The design of meaningful features to support 
convergence also sparked the interest of researchers 
who investigated e.g., the design of adequate rating 
scales [10], meaningful presentation modes of ideas [7] 
or targeted digital facilitation intervention [11]. 
We propose that digital nudges, digital interventions 
that alter “people’s behavior in a predictable way” [12], 
could help raters to experience lower perceived 
cognitive effort during convergence and achieve higher 
reduction rates (smaller consideration set sizes). Digital 
nudging aims at explaining how user-interface design 
elements affect individual’s information processing and 
choices [13]. It is crucial to identify influential digital 
nudges that are able to alter human behavior to such 
extent that they can significantly drive convergence 
outcomes. While past research has identified a number 
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of digital nudges, we still lack conceptual understanding 
of how those digital nudges affect behavior and 
outcomes [13], specifically in the application domain of 
idea selection as part of open innovation initiatives.  
This paper aims at addressing this gap, by 
investigating the effects of two digital nudges on 
convergence outcomes. We draw on an online 
laboratory experiment involving 88 participants to 
empirically test the effects of selection strategy and idea 
similarity on consideration set size and perceived 
cognitive effort.  
 
 
2. Background  
 
2.1. Digital nudging 
 
Nudges describe small objects placed into an 
environment to steer people in particular directions. 
This could be the placement of nutritious food into the 
middle of a food court or having a painted fly on a men’s 
urinal [14]. They are interventions into human behavior 
and are more than the mere provision of factual 
information or rational persuasion [12]. Hansen defines 
a nudge as [12]: 
 
“a function of (I) any attempt at influencing people’s 
judgment, choice or behavior in a predictable way, that 
is (1) made possible because of cognitive boundaries, 
biases, routines and habits in individual and social 
decision-making posing barriers for people to perform 
rationally in their own declared self-interests, and 
which (2) works by making use of those boundaries, 
biases, routines, and habits as integral parts of such 
attempts.”  
 
Multiple types of nudges have been identified, such 
as default rules, active choosing, increase in ease and 
convenience, simplification, warnings, or reminders and 
their effects have been studied in domains such as policy 
making [15]. Recently, also the term digital nudge 
emerged to describe nudges in the form of user-interface 
design elements that exist in online choice environments 
[13], in our case an idea convergence platform. These 
design elements alter information processing in order to 
affect our judgments and choices [16].  
 
2.2. Dual processing and convergence outcomes 
 
Dual processing theory suggests that there are two 
systems at work when humans judge and engage in 
decision-making [17].  
System 1 processing is unconscious, implicit, 
automatic, requires low effort, and is rapid [18]. In 
contrast, system 2 processing is conscious, explicit, 
controlled requires high effort and is slow [18], but 
should lead to highly accurate choices [19]. System 1 
processing is prone to cognitive biases, which may 
result in imperfect decisions [17], [20]. Such biases are 
systematic errors in our decision making [20] and might 
therefore be detrimental to successful idea convergence. 
Decision makers might not process all ideas in depth to 
come to an informed decision and hence are more likely 
to miss good ideas.  
Consequently, perceived cognitive effort might be a 
promising convergence outcome to be investigated, 
because it indicates to what extent decision makers 
engaged in effortful thinking. In addition, the success of 
overall idea selection might depend on adequate 
consideration set sizes after convergence. If 
consideration sets are too large, more resources, i.e. 
experts’ time, are required to make a final selection and 
experts might be overloaded thus hampering the 
decision outcome. If consideration sets are too small, the 
variety of ideas might appear too small and thus affect 
experts’ confidence in making an informed decision to 
determine the winner idea(s). This suggests that 
successful convergence should also consider 
consideration set size as an indicator of performance. 
 
 
3. Hypotheses 
 
3.1. Selection strategy 
Prompting raters towards eliminating bad ideas 
(lemons) showed to achieve higher evaluation accuracy 
than prompting them towards selecting good ideas 
(stars) [21]. The task prompt to choose good ideas or 
eliminate bad ideas can be connected to theory on 
inclusion and exclusion strategies [22], [23]. With 
inclusion, a decision maker decides whether an “option 
should be seriously considered for a final choice” [22, 
p. 1194]. With exclusion, the decision maker decides 
whether an “option should be dropped from further 
consideration” [22, p. 1194].  
Independent of the task type, decision makers that 
adopt an exclusion strategy are likely to end up with 
larger consideration set sizes [22], [23]. Rietzschel et al. 
[24] confirmed that the hypothesis of larger 
consideration set sizes for exclusion also holds true for 
the selection of creative ideas. In their experiment, 
participants self-generated the ideas that they later 
converged on. It remains empirically unexplored, if 
theory of larger consideration set sizes under exclusion 
holds when decision makers converge on ideas that are 
not their own as is the case for idea convergence in open 
innovation initiatives.  
In addition, information-processing behavior differs 
for individuals that follow an inclusion compared to an 
exclusion strategy. Past research showed that decision 
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makers adopting an inclusion strategy examine more 
attributes of an alternative (breadth) and spend more 
time on an alternative (depth). This observation was 
particularly pronounced for individuals with high need 
for cognition [23]. In-depth processing might be even 
higher when decision makers are prompted to select 
ideas that are not their own, because they have limited 
information about the idea [25]. Hence, the basic 
mechanism behind such a digital nudge “selection 
strategy” is to alter the depth and breadth of information 
processing of alternatives and their attributes. 
In an online environment, a task prompt in 
connection with a check box or toggle switch provides 
the necessary means to nudge decision makers either 
into including or excluding ideas. This is a nudge of type 
active choosing [15], which lets decision makers make 
a conscious decision. This means in any case, the 
decision maker needs to act to choose an idea (inclusion 
condition) or drop an idea (exclusion condition). Thus,  
 
H1: Decision makers tasked to reduce ideas by 
inclusion will have a smaller consideration set than 
decision makers tasked to reduce ideas by exclusion. 
 
H2: Decision makers tasked to reduce ideas by 
inclusion will have higher perceived cognitive effort 
than decision makers tasked to reduce ideas by 
exclusion. 
 
3.2. Idea subset similarity  
Many idea selection initiatives struggle with a high 
number of similar and duplicate ideas submitted to a 
contest [26]. The extent of idea similarity can provide 
indication about the quality of an idea but research 
findings are heterogeneous whether similarity of ideas 
is a good or bad indicator of idea quality e.g., [27]–[29]. 
Even more under-researched is our understanding of 
how similarity among ideas affects the decision making 
processes. Field research indicates that categorizing 
ideas makes the reduction of ideas easier [5]. A reason 
for this provides extant literature in consumer research, 
which showed that a lack of categorization may 
contribute to choice overload [30]. Choice overload sets 
in when a decision maker is faced with a complex 
decision, which exceeds his or her individual cognitive 
resources [31]. Hence, when being confronted with 
uncategorized alternatives, decision makers find it 
harder to navigate the choice set [30] because the 
extracted features are not comparable. When similar 
alternatives are presented and therefore overlaps in the 
alternatives’ features exist [32] the choice should 
become easier. The digital nudge “idea subset 
similarity” is of type increase in ease and convenience, 
which is implemented as a similarity feature (see 
Section 4) and aims at reducing perceived difficulty 
[15]. 
The basic mechanism behind this nudge is that it 
makes it easier to compare features of alternatives when 
similar ideas are presented and can be analyzed at once. 
When features of alternatives are not aligned (dissimilar 
idea sets), decision makers show higher search costs 
[33], which might indicate higher perceived cognitive 
effort. When the demand on perceived cognitive effort 
increases to such an extent that decision makers 
experience choice overload, they should be less likely to 
make a choice at all (choice deferral) [34]. When 
applying this line of argument to the context of idea 
convergence, this suggests that choosing from a set of 
dissimilar ideas should result in larger consideration set 
sizes, because decision makers would defer their 
choices and more perceived cognitive effort is required 
due to increased search cost. In case of choosing from 
similar ideas, decision makers should end up with 
smaller consideration set sizes and experience lower 
perceived cognitive effort, because it is easier for them 
to compare the features inherent to the ideas and make a 
choice. Thus, 
 
H3: Decision makers presented with subsets defined 
by idea similarity will have a smaller consideration set 
than decision makers presented with random subsets. 
 
H4: Decision makers presented with subsets defined 
by idea similarity will perceive lower perceived 
cognitive effort than decision makers presented with 
random subsets. 
 
 
4. Method  
 
We conducted a 2x2 between-subjects laboratory 
experiment to explore the associations between our two 
manipulated convergence mechanisms selection 
strategy and idea similarity and the two dependent 
variables consideration set size and perceived cognitive 
effort. In the following, we describe the experimental 
design and the methods we used to analyze the data 
collected. 
 
4.1. Manipulation 
 
We implemented the two digital nudges (1) selection 
strategy with the two options of inclusion and exclusion 
(active choosing) and (2) idea similarity with the two 
options similarity-based and random decomposition of 
ideas into subsets (increase in ease and convenience) in 
an online convergence platform using HTML5, AJAX, 
jQuery, Javascript, mySQL and PHP. This system 
allowed us to present participants with four treatments 
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and to collect data on their choices, demographic data 
and participants’ perceptions on the decision process 
and outcome. 
 
Selection strategy. The system provides the 
participants with a task explanation that states that they 
can either “choose” or “drop” ideas. The task prompt 
conveyed that experts will consider the lists of ideas 
selected by participants. This aimed at framing the 
experimental task as idea convergence and not winner 
determination. Furthermore, the ideas have a checkbox 
next to them which, when selected, displays either the 
“ü” symbol for the decision making variable “choose” 
(Figure 1) or the symbol “û” for the “drop” variable 
(Figure 2). Hence, in the inclusion treatment subjects 
had to actively choose the “ü” box, whereas subjects in 
the exclusion treatment had to actively choose the “û” 
box. We refrained from using red and green colors to not 
adversely affect subjects that are red-green colorblind. 
 
Figure	1:	Selection	strategy:	inclusion	
 
 
 
Figure	2:	Selection	strategy:	exclusion	
 
Idea subset similarity. Our platform divides the 
initial set of generated ideas into subsets of five ideas 
that are considered in separate rounds. This division into 
                                                            
2 https://wordnet.princeton.edu  
subsets of five ideas, which represents a small choice set 
[34], was held constant for all treatments. This should 
facilitate idea convergence as it helps guide the attention 
to a few ideas at a time [11]. Still, given the context of 
the study, individuals are likely to experience cognitive 
overload even with small choice sets because the 
decision task is difficult, individual’s preference is 
uncertain, and the overall choice set is complex [34]. We 
implemented the digital nudge “idea subset similarity” 
so that the platform presents either random or similarity-
based subsets of ideas, but no further indication, e.g., 
category description, was provided. 
For random decomposition of idea subsets, our 
convergence platform calls a subset of five ideas out of 
the total set of 75 ideas from a MySQL database system 
at a time with a simple random function that the 
database management system offers. The system repeats 
this drawing of five ideas until all ideas from the initial 
idea pool have been shown to participants exactly once. 
For decomposition of similar idea subsets, the 
platform selects the five most similar ideas out of the 
idea pool, removes them from the pool and repeats the 
drawing until all ideas are presented exactly once. We 
measure the similarity of ideas with an algorithm that 
determines and weighs similarity between ideas. While 
generally there is a plethora of text analysis techniques, 
many focus on comparing two long text fragments or a 
short to a long one [35], [36]. As our idea pool contains 
short sentences, it is difficult to apply those machine 
learning algorithms to determine similarity. Therefore, 
we devised a custom algorithm. 
The algorithm first performs some text 
preprocessing, i.e. removal of stop words. The algorithm 
then acquires the synonyms of all remaining words from 
the WordNet ontology database2 that offers English 
nouns, verbs, adjectives and adverbs grouped into sets 
of cognitive synonyms and interlinked by means of 
conceptual-semantic and lexical relations, resulting in a 
network of meaningfully related words and concepts. 
We employ the WordNet API to get the synonyms for 
each word of an idea using a threshold of 30 for the 
semantic distance calculated by WordNet, as this 
threshold marks a noticeable decrease in the similarity 
between the original word and synonyms beyond this 
distance. Every idea is therefore enriched by its 
synonyms. 
The algorithm selects an enriched idea as reference 
idea and compares it to every other idea in the set, thus 
calculating a similarity metric of the number of matched 
words between two ideas, both original words and 
synonyms. The algorithm creates a subset of the 
reference idea plus the four ideas with the highest values 
on this similarity metric and records the subset’s total 
Page 4418
similarity score. The algorithm then removes these five 
ideas from the idea pool and repeats this drawing 
process until all ideas have been shown to participants 
exactly once. 
We found this algorithm to yield the highest total 
similarity score (2,737 matches of words) out of a series 
of options we experimented with. 
 
4.2. Subjects 
 
We recruited 93 bachelor students from the 
introductory course to Information Systems at a 
European university. We deem students as appropriate 
representatives of crowd workers, who are 
predominantly young, hold a bachelor’s degree and 
have a rather low income [37]. Their participation was 
voluntary and they received course credit for their 
participation. While the experiment was in English, the 
course language was German. Due to the fact that 
English proficiency is high throughout the university 
and no problems related to language were raised during 
or after the experiment, we do not expect that there 
existed a language barrier that could have affected the 
results of the experiment. The participants’ average age 
was 21.5 years. 
 
4.3. Measures 
 
We measured the two dependent variables 
consideration set size plus perceived cognitive effort 
and controlled for gender, domain expertise, and need 
for cognition.  
 
Consideration set size describes the number of 
ideas retained after the convergence task [24]. For 
subjects in the inclusion treatment, we counted the 
number of ideas they selected into their consideration 
set. For subjects in the exclusion treatment, we counted 
the number of ideas they did not exclude and therefore 
remained in their consideration set. 
 
Perceived cognitive effort refers to the degree of 
engagement with a demanding task [38]. We adopted 
three items [39], [40] and adapted the items to 
correspond to the study’s context: “The task of selecting 
ideas took too much time”, “Selecting ideas required too 
much effort”, and “Selecting ideas was too complex”.  
 
Controls. We controlled for gender, domain 
expertise, and need for cognition. Gender was part of the 
demographic data we collected and found to be strongly 
correlated with consideration set size and hence taken 
up as control in our further data analysis. Domain 
expertise and need for cognition were included, because 
they have been identified as relevant factors for choice 
overload [34] and therefore the perception of cognitive 
effort. We self-developed the construct of domain 
expertise by formulating the five items: “I have 
expertise in the topic of emergency response.”, “I have 
experience with emergency response.”, “I am very 
competent in the topic of emergency response.”, “I am 
not familiar with the topic of emergency response. (r)”, 
and “Emergency response interests me.” We adopted 
five items from [41] to measure need for cognition. The 
scale assesses to what extent individuals engage and 
enjoy thinking with the items “I don’t like to have to do 
a lot of thinking.(r)”, “I try to avoid situations that 
require thinking in-depth about something.(r)”, “I prefer 
complex problems over simple problems.”,  “I prefer to 
do something that challenges my thinking abilities 
rather than something that requires little thought.”, and 
“Thinking hard and for a long time about something 
gives me little satisfaction. (r)”. 
 
4.4. Procedure and task 
 
The experiment consisted of the three phases (1) task 
description and consent, (2) convergence task and (3) 
post-task survey.   
Students were (1) informed about our experiment 
and that participation is voluntary, anonymous and 
incentivized by course credit. They signed a consent 
form if they volunteered to participate. We also 
informed participants that there is no time limit for 
completing the experiment and that one of the authors 
was available to answer any questions they might have 
or help with technical difficulties that they might 
experience.  
Concerning the (2) convergence task, emails with a 
link to the web page which hosted the convergence 
platform were sent before class to each student taking 
the course. We randomly assigned students into one of 
four treatment groups resulting from a 2x2 factorial 
design. In each treatment group, participants were 
tasked to converge on a total of 75 ideas, decomposed 
into 15 subsets of five ideas presented per page. The 
ideas suggested help measures to tackle the problems of 
a fictional town “Norvos” getting hit by extreme 
flooding which was based on real events. The ideas had 
been generated in a previous crowdsourcing initiative. 
Our participants’ task was, based on their treatment 
group, to choose (drop) the help measures that they 
deemed relevant and useful (neither relevant, nor useful) 
and that should (should not) be further considered by a 
team of emergency response experts. Participants were 
informed that they could select any number of ideas 
between zero and five per page.  
We finally asked participants to complete a (3) post-
task survey with which we collected data on perceived 
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cognitive effort, need for cognition, domain expertise, 
and demographics. 
 
 
5. Results  
 
Manipulation check and outliers. To check whether 
a subject correctly perceived the selection strategy, we 
included the item “What decision making choice were 
you presented with? [choose idea or drop idea]. We had 
to exclude four subjects who were tasked to drop ideas 
but answered that their task was to choose ideas. To check 
if subjects correctly perceived idea set similarity, we 
included the item “To what extent did you perceive ideas 
in sets of 5 to be similar?” and measured it on a 5-point 
Likert scale. We performed an ANOVA to assess whether 
subjects perceived the idea sets in the similarity treatment 
as more similar than in the random treatment. Results 
indicate a non-significant effect (F(1, 86)=0.049, p > 
0.05). Our participants perceived the ideas as somewhat 
similar in both the similarity treatment (M=2.10; 
SD=0.69) and the random treatment (M=2.07; SD=0.57). 
Moreover, we dismissed data of one student as an outlier, 
because he finished the task within 59 seconds, whereas 
the average time spent in his treatment group was 13:08 
minutes. Across all treatment groups participants needed 
13:54 minutes on average to complete the experiment. 
The final dataset contained 88 subjects of which were 44 
female and 44 male students, which were unequally 
distributed between treatments (Table 1).  
 
Reliability and validity. We performed reliability 
analysis and exploratory factor analysis for domain 
expertise, perceived need for cognition and cognitive 
effort in an iterative manner to establish reliability and 
validity of our perceptual constructs. Cronbach’s 
Alphas for perceived cognitive effort and need for 
cognition was below the recommended threshold of 0.7 
[42]. Reliability of perceived cognitive effort could have 
been improved by dropping the third item, but we 
decided against that in order to follow the 
recommendation to measure perceptual constructs with 
at least three items [43]. Also the Exploratory Factor 
Analysis (EFA with Promax rotation) revealed in our 
first attempt a four-factor instead of a three-factor 
solution. Two items of need for cognition and one item 
for domain knowledge loaded poorly on their latent 
factor. Therefore, we dropped those items and repeated 
reliability and validity analyses. After revision, we 
deemed Cronbach’s Alphas acceptable for perceived 
cognitive effort (α = 0.656), need for cognition (α = 
0.680), and domain knowledge (α = 0.921). Also 
convergent validity was deemed satisfactory with factor 
loadings > 0.5 and Measures of Sampling Adequacy 
(MSA) > 0.5. Also discriminant validity was deemed 
satisfactory as the pattern matrix suggested a three-
factor solution [43]. We then used an averaged scale for 
domain expertise and created a binary variable for need 
for cognition using median split to interpret low and 
high need for cognition individuals. 
 
Controls. We ran ANOVAs on gender, domain 
expertise, and need for cognition. There were no 
significant differences between treatments for each of 
the control variables (Fgender=1.028, Fdomain_expertise = 
0.185, Fneed_for_cognition = 1.920). 
 
Tests of assumptions for MANCOVA. We added 
gender, domain expertise, and need for cognition as co-
variates and performed a MANCOVA specifying 
selection strategy (choose, drop) and idea similarity 
(similar, random) as independent variables and 
consideration set size and perceived cognitive effort as 
dependent variables. The descriptive statistics are given 
in Table 1. Concerning the assumption of equality of 
variance-covariance matrices, we assessed the Box’s M 
test using the recommended conservative significance 
level of 0.01 [43]. The test statistic indicates that there 
exist no significant differences between treatment 
groups (p > 0.01) and therefore the assumption is not 
violated. Concerning the assumption of multivariate 
normal distribution, which cannot be directly tested in 
SPSS, we fell back to the common procedure to assess 
normal distribution for each dependent variable per 
treatment group with the Shapiro-Wilk test [43]. All 
normality tests showed insignificant values (p > 0.05) 
indicating that the data does not significantly deviate 
from a normal distribution. We also drew on 
scatterplots, which visually supported this statistical 
result.  
 
Table	1:	Descriptive	statistics	of	treatment	groups	
 Choose 
/ 
random 
Choose 
/ 
similar 
Drop / 
random 
Drop / 
similar 
# of 
subjects 
20 25 22 21 
# of 
selected 
ideas 
39.25 
(9.13) 
33.80 
(10.53)  
62.14 
(5.00) 
59.76 
(7.18)  
Perceived 
cognitive 
effort 
3.63 
(0.59) 
3.43 
(0.61)  
3.12 
(0.85) 
3.11 
(0.64)  
Gender 10 m / 
10 f 
9 m / 
16 f 
13 m / 
9 f 
12 m / 
9 f 
Domain 
expertise 
4.03 
(0.80)  
4.09 
(1.01) 
4.18 
(0.91)  
3.98 
(1.08) 
Need for 
cognition 
1.98 
(0.68) 
1.87 
(0.65) 
2.33 
(0.67) 
2.08 
(0.74) 
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Hypotheses testing. The multivariate test statistic 
shows a significant main effect for selection strategy 
(Pillai’s trace = 0.735, F (2, 80) = 111.168, p < 0.001), 
idea similarity (Pillai’s trace = 0.079, F (2, 80) = 3.427, p 
=  0.037), gender (Pillai’s trace = 0.095, F(2, 80) = 4.215, 
p = 0.018), and need for cognition (Pillai’s trace = 0.097, 
F ( 2, 80) = 4.308, p = 0.017). There was no significant 
main effect for the covariate domain expertise (Pillai’s 
trace = 0.050, F(2, 80) = 2.119, p > 0.05). There was also 
no significant multivariate interaction effect (Pillai’s trace 
= 0.009, F(2, 80) = 0.688, p > 0.05). Hypotheses testing 
proceeded with interpreting the univariate test statistics, 
which are summarized in Table 2. 
H1 suggested that consideration sets would be 
smaller and H2 suggested that perceived cognitive effort 
would be higher for decision makers who chose ideas 
(inclusion) than for decision makers who dropped ideas 
(exclusion). The univariate test statistics show 
significant differences for consideration set size (F (1, 
81) = 208.825, p < 0.001, partial η2 = 0.721) and 
perceived cognitive effort (F (1, 81) = 5.268, p = 0.024, 
partial η2 = 0.061). Decision makers who chose ideas 
had on average 36.22 out of 75 ideas in their 
consideration sets in contrast to 60.98 out of 75 ideas for 
decision makers who dropped ideas. Hence, directing 
decision makers towards choosing ideas resulted in 
smaller consideration sets, which supports H1. 
Moreover, decision makers perceived on average higher 
cognitive effort when choosing ideas (M = 3.52) than 
when dropping ideas (M = 3.12). Therefore, also H2 is 
supported. 
H3 and H4 were concerned with the effects of idea 
similarity and suggested that consideration sets would 
be smaller and perceived cognitive effort would be 
lower for decision makers who select from similar ideas 
in subsets compared to decision makers who select from 
random ideas. The univariate test statistics show 
significant differences for consideration set size (F (1, 
81) = 6.146, p = 0.015, partial η2 = 0.071) but not for 
perceived cognitive effort (F (1, 81) = 1.389, p > 0.05, 
partial η2 = 0.017). Decision makers who chose or 
dropped ideas from subsets with similar ideas had on 
average 45.65 out of 75 ideas in their final consideration 
sets compared to 51.24 out of 75 ideas for decision 
makers presented with subsets of randomly allocated 
ideas. Hence, H3 is supported. Moreover, the cognitive 
effort was perceived lower in the similarity treatment 
(M = 3.28) than in the random treatment (M = 3.37). 
This direction was as expected, but the difference was 
not significant and therefore H4 is not supported. 
 
Controls  
We further investigated the significant multivariate 
main effects of the control variables (see Table 2).  
There exists a significant univariate main effect of 
gender on consideration set size (F(1, 81) = 8.604, p = 
0.004). Men selected more ideas (M=52.61, SD=12.75) 
than women (M=44.02, SD=16.03). There was no 
significant main effect of gender on perceived cognitive 
effort (F(1, 81) = 0.000, p > 0.05). 
We found a significant univariate main effect for 
need for cognition on consideration set size (F(1, 81) = 
5.978, p = 0.017). Yet, further bi-variate correlation 
analysis revealed no significant direct association 
between need for cognition and consideration set size. 
We also found a significant univariate main effect for 
perceived need for cognition on cognitive effort (F(1, 
81) = 6.066, p = 0.016). Individuals with low need for 
cognition perceived the task to be more cognitively 
effortful (M= 3.58, SD = 0.71) than individuals with 
high need for cognition (M = 3.14, SD = 0.64). 
 
Table	2:	Results	of	hypotheses	tests	
Source DF  Mean 
square 
F p-value Partial ƞ2 
ANOVA Dependent variable: Consideration set size 
Selection strategy  1  12004.933 208.825 0.000 0.721 
Idea similarity 1  353.318 6.146 0.015 0.071 
Gender 1  494.609 8.604 0.004 0.096 
Domain expertise 1  230.633 4.012 0.049 0.047 
Need for cognition 1  343.691 5.978 0.017 0.069 
Error 81  57.488    
ANOVA Dependent variable: Perceived cognitive effort 
Selection strategy  1  2.310 5.268 0.024 0.061 
Idea similarity 1  0.609 1.389 0.242 0.017 
Gender 1  0.000 0.000 0.997 0.000 
Domain expertise 1  0.255 0.581 0.448 0.255 
Need for cognition 1  2.660 6.066 0.016 2.660 
Error 81  0.438    
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6. Implications, Limitations and Future Research 
 
This research set out to investigate which digital 
nudges can achieve improved convergence outcomes in 
open innovation initiatives. We tested the digital nudges 
“selection strategy” and “idea subset similarity” and 
found that “selection strategy” is significantly 
associated with consideration set size and perceived 
cognitive effort while “idea subset similarity” is also 
significantly associated with consideration set size but 
only weakly significantly associated with perceived 
cognitive effort.  
 
Theoretical implications. We provide empirical 
evidence that the digital nudge of “selection strategy” 
successfully prompted individuals towards either 
including (choose) promising or excluding (drop) non-
promising ideas. Our findings show that individuals 
prompted with an inclusion strategy form smaller 
consideration sets than under an exclusion strategy. This 
confirms the effects of inclusion/exclusion on 
consideration set size in a setting of convergence with 
crowd-generated ideas.  
In addition, individuals prompted with inclusion 
also showed higher perceived cognitive effort. This 
finding suggests that in the inclusion treatment 
participants adapted decision strategies that process 
alternatives in depth and hence require more cognitive 
resources. Hence, our findings contribute an additional 
relationship between inclusion/exclusion strategies and 
perceived cognitive effort to theory. 
Moreover, this study provides empirical evidence 
that there exists a relationship between the digital nudge 
“idea subset similarity” and consideration set size. Our 
findings show that decision makers created significantly 
smaller consideration sets when the convergence system 
presented them with subsets defined by idea similarity. 
To our surprise, we did not find empirical evidence that 
“idea subset similarity” was significantly associated 
with perceived cognitive effort. The direction of our 
theorizing is supported but the difference was not 
significant on the 0.05 level. A reason could be that the 
subset size of five as an intervention already sufficiently 
decreased cognitive effort to curb choice deferral [44]. 
Hence, our findings add a new hypothesis to the body of 
literature on selection that consideration set sizes are 
smaller when people can choose from choice sets that 
include similar alternatives rather than from randomly 
arranged choice sets. 
 
Practical implications. Our findings have also 
implications for managers and designers. Managers of 
open innovation initiatives can benefit from our findings 
in two ways. First, if their concern is to drastically 
reduce a huge number of ideas into a shortlist, they 
should prompt their raters towards an inclusion strategy 
and present them with subsets of similar ideas. 
However, the inclusion strategy might demand quite 
substantial perceived cognitive effort from the raters. 
Second, if the concern is to reduce perceived cognitive 
effort, they should prompt their raters towards 
exclusion. However, in this case managers need to 
anticipate larger consideration sets. This is an 
interesting trade-off. Either opt for larger consideration 
sets and lower perceived cognitive effort or smaller 
consideration sets and higher perceived cognitive 
efforts. It suggests that managers should get to know 
their crowd workers whether they enjoy effortful 
thinking tasks or not. If this is the case, managers can 
achieve the best convergence outcomes by adopting the 
“idea strategy” digital nudge of exclusion.  
 
Limitations. There also exist some limitations that 
need to be considered when drawing on our findings. 
Our idea similarity manipulation needs to be interpreted 
carefully because subjects did not perceive subsets as 
significantly more similar in this treatment condition 
than in the random condition. This perception might 
have been influenced by the decreasing level of 
similarity among ideas the further decision makers 
proceeded in the assessment. Such decreasing similarity 
is a function of the algorithm we employed for 
decomposition of ideas into subsets.  
Moreover, we drew on a small student population 
to mimic a crowd of non-experts. It could be that the 
effects of idea similarity change once the assessment is 
performed by individuals with high domain expertise. 
Further data collection is necessary to increase sample 
size. 
 
Future research. The reported research discovered 
novel relevant relationships between digital nudges and 
convergence outcomes. The underlying behavioral and 
cognitive mechanisms, which explain these 
relationships were theorized but not tested. Hence, 
future research should dig deeper into the discovered 
relationships and set out to find empirical evidence that 
supports (or fails to support) these relationships. 
While this study compares inclusion to exclusion 
strategies in convergence of crowd-generated ideas, 
future research could investigate how effects change 
when the digital nudge “selection strategy” is less 
restrictive and allows to choose and drop ideas at the 
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same time or to apply a sequence of inclusion and 
exclusion in a multi-stage convergence process.  
Future research could also investigate if the digital 
nudge idea subset similarity is more influential at the 
beginning or the end of a decision making process. 
Future research could assess the effectiveness of this 
nudge of idea similarity by comparing the results of the 
first rounds where the perception of similarity among 
ideas was likely to be high with later rounds of less 
similar ideas. Moreover, it would be interesting to find 
out if the effectiveness of idea subset similarity depends 
on sizes of subsets. While our algorithm used a fixed 
subset size of five ideas, future research might explore 
the effects of an endogenous definition of subset size 
based on ideas similarity or compare small versus large 
subsets. 
In this study, participants had to decide on the most 
promising ideas from 75 ideas. While the number of 
ideas presented appears to be big, each of the ideas were 
described in one sentence. It is likely that perceived 
cognitive effort would increase considerably with an 
increase of text length and potentially more inherent 
features. Hence, future research could replicate this 
study but switch to ideas with longer descriptions.  
 
Acknowledgements 
The research leading to the presented results was 
partially funded by the Austrian Science Fund (FWF): P 
29765.  
 
7. References  
 
[1] W. Chesbrough, Open Innovation: The New 
Imperative for Creating and Profiting from 
Technology. 2006. 
[2] A. King and K. R. Lakhani, “Using Open 
Innovation to Identify the Best Ideas,” MIT 
Sloan Manag. Rev., vol. 55, no. 1, pp. 41–48, 
2013. 
[3] K. Girotra, C. Terwiesch, and K. T. Ulrich, 
“Idea Generation and the Quality of the Best 
Idea,” Manage. Sci., vol. 56, no. 4, pp. 591–605, 
2010. 
[4] G. Jouret, “Inside Cisco’s search for the next big 
idea,” Harv. Bus. Rev., vol. September, pp. 1–7, 
2009. 
[5] O. M. Bjelland and R. C. Wood, “An Inside 
View of IBM ’ s ‘ Innovation Jam ’ An Inside 
View of IBM ’ s ‘ Innovation Jam,” MIT Sloan 
Manag. Rev., vol. 50, no. 1, pp. 32–40, 2008. 
[6] A. Sukhov, “The role of perceived 
comprehension in idea evaluation,” Creat. 
Innov. Manag., no. January, pp. 183–195, 2018. 
[7] B. Onarheim and B. T. Christensen, 
“Distributed idea screening in stage–gate 
development processes,” J. Eng. Des., vol. 23, 
no. 9, pp. 660–673, 2012. 
[8] C. Faure, “Beyond brainstorming: Effects of 
different group procedures on selection of ideas 
and satisfaction with the process,” J. Creat. 
Behav., vol. 38, no. 1, pp. 13–34, 2004. 
[9] L. J. Kornish and J. Hutchison-Krupat, 
“Research on Idea Generation and Selection: 
Implications for Management of Technology,” 
Prod. Oper. Manag., vol. 26, no. 4, pp. 633–
651, 2017. 
[10] I. Blohm, C. Riedl, J. Füller, and J. M. 
Leimeister, “Rate or Trade? Identifying 
Winning Ideas in Open Idea Sourcing,” Inf. 
Syst. Res., no. April, pp. 1–53, 2016. 
[11] I. Seeber, R. Maier, G.-J. de Vreede, and B. 
Weber, “Beyond Brainstorming : Exploring 
Convergence in Teams,” J. Manag. Inf. Syst., 
vol. 17, no. 4, pp. 1–42, 2017. 
[12] P. G. Hansen, “The definition of nudge and 
libertarian paternalism: Does the hand fit the 
glove?,” Eur. J. Risk Regul., vol. 7, no. 1, pp. 
155–174, 2016. 
[13] M. Weinmann, C. Schneider, and J. vom 
Brocke, “Digital Nudging,” Bus. Inf. Syst. Eng., 
vol. 58, no. 6, pp. 433–436, 2016. 
[14] R. H. Thaler and C. R. Sunstein, Nudge: 
Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and 
Happiness. New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2009. 
[15] C. R. Sunstein, “Nudging: A Very Short 
Guide,” J. Consum. Policy, vol. 37, no. 4, pp. 
583–588, 2014. 
[16] S. Stieglitz, T. Potthoff, and T. Kißmer, “Digital 
Nudging am Arbeitsplatz,” HMD Prax. der 
Wirtschaftsinformatik, pp. 965–976, 2017. 
[17] D. Kahneman, Thinking Fast and Slow. 
Macmillan, 2011. 
[18] J. S. B. T. Evans, “Dual-Processing Accounts of 
Reasoning, Judgment, and Social Cognition,” 
Annu. Rev. Psychol., vol. 59, no. 1, pp. 255–278, 
2008. 
[19] E. J. Johnson and J. W. Payne, “Effort and 
Accuracy in Choice,” Manage. Sci., vol. 31, no. 
4, pp. 395–414, 1985. 
[20] Daniel Kahneman, Amos Tversky, and Paul 
Slovic, Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics 
& Biases, vol. 16, no. 185. 1974. 
[21] M. Klein and A. C. B. Garcia, “High-speed idea 
Page 4423
filtering with the bag of lemons,” Decis. 
Support Syst., vol. 78, pp. 39–50, 2015. 
[22] D. Heller, I. P. Levin, and M. Goransson, 
“Selection of strategies for narrowing choice 
options: Antecedents and consequences,” 
Organ. Behav. Hum. Decis. Process., vol. 89, 
no. 2, pp. 1194–1213, 2002. 
[23] I. Levin, M. Huneke, and J. Jasper, “Information 
Processing at Successive Stages of Decision 
Making: Need for Cognition and Inclusion-
Exclusion Effects.,” Organ. Behav. Hum. Decis. 
Process., vol. 82, no. 2, pp. 171–193, 2000. 
[24] E. F. Rietzschel, B. a Nijstad, and W. Stroebe, 
“The selection of creative ideas after individual 
idea generation: choosing between creativity 
and impact.,” Br. J. Psychol., vol. 101, no. Pt 1, 
pp. 47–68, Feb. 2010. 
[25] I. Seeber, A. B. Merz, R. Maier, G.-J. de 
Vreede, and B. Weber, “Convergence on Self-
Generated vs. Crowdsourced Ideas in Crisis 
Response: Comparing Social Exchange 
Processes and Satisfaction with Process,” Proc. 
50th Hawaii Int. Conf. Syst. Sci., pp. 1–10, 
2017. 
[26] P. M. Di Gangi, M. M. Wasko, and R. E. 
Hooker, “Getting Customers’ Ideas to Work for 
You: Kearning from Dell how to Succeed with 
Online User Innovation Communities,” MIS Q. 
Exec., vol. 9, no. 4, pp. 197–212, 2010. 
[27] T. P. Walter and A. Back, “A text mining 
approach to evaluate submissions to 
crowdsourcing contests,” Proc. Annu. Hawaii 
Int. Conf. Syst. Sci., pp. 3109–3118, 2013. 
[28] L. J. Kornish and K. T. Ulrich, “Opportunity 
Spaces in Innovation: Empirical Analysis of 
Large Samples of Ideas,” Manage. Sci., vol. 57, 
no. 1, pp. 107–128, 2011. 
[29] O. Toubia and O. Netzer, “Idea Generation , 
Creativity , and Prototypicality,” Mark. Sci., 
vol. 25, no. 5, pp. 411–425, 2016. 
[30] B. Scheibehenne, R. Greifeneder, and P. M. 
Todd, “Can There Ever Be Too Many Options? 
A Meta-Analytic Review of Choice Overload,” 
J. Consum. Res., vol. 37, no. 3, pp. 409–425, 
2010. 
[31] H. A. Simon, “A Behavioral Model Of Rational 
Choice,” Q. J. Econ., vol. 69, no. 1, pp. 99–118, 
1955. 
[32] A. Fox, C., & Tversky, “Ambiguity Aversion 
and Comparative Ignorance,” Q. J. Econ., vol. 
110, no. 3, pp. 585–603, 1995. 
[33] J. G. Griffin and S. M. Broniarczyk, “The 
Slippery Slope: The Impact of Feature 
Alignability on Search and Satisfaction,” J. 
Mark. Res., vol. 47, no. 2, pp. 323–334, 2010. 
[34] A. Chernev, U. Böckenholt, and J. Goodman, 
“Choice overload: A conceptual review and 
meta-analysis,” J. Consum. Psychol., vol. 25, 
no. 2, pp. 333–358, 2012. 
[35] D. Ramage, A. N. Rafferty, and C. D. Manning, 
“Random Walks for Text Semantic Similarity,” 
in Proceedings of the 2009 Workshop on 
Graph-based Methods for Natural Language 
Processing, 2009, pp. 23–31. 
[36] A. Kashyap et al., Robust semantic text 
similarity using LSA, machine learning, and 
linguistic resources, vol. 50, no. 1. Springer 
Netherlands, 2016. 
[37] J. Ross, A. Zaldivar, L. Irani, and B. Tomlinson, 
“Who are the Turkers? Worker Demographics 
in Amazon Mechanical Turk,” Chi Ea 2010, no. 
July 2016, pp. 2863–2872, 2010. 
[38] A. Westbrook and T. S. Braver, “Cognitive 
effort: A neuroeconomic approach,” Cogn. 
Affect. Behav. Neurosci., vol. 15, no. 2, pp. 395–
415, 2015. 
[39] R. Pereira, “Influence of query-based decision 
aids on consumer decision making in electronic 
commerce,” Inf. Resour. Manag. J., vol. 14, no. 
1, pp. 31–48, 2001. 
[40] W. Wang and I. Benbasat, “Interactive Decision 
Aids For Consumer Decision Making in E-
Commerce: The Influence of Perceived Strategy 
Restrictiveness,” MIS Q., vol. 33, no. 2, pp. 
293–320, 2009. 
[41] K. Y. Tam and Y. H. Schuk, “Web 
Personalization as a Persuasion Strategy: An 
Elaboration Likelihood Model Perspective,” 
Inf. Syst. Res., vol. 16, no. 3, pp. 271–291, 2005. 
[42] J. C. Nunnally and I. H. Bernstein, 
“Psychometric theory,” 1978. 
[43] J. F. Hair, W. C. Black, B. J. Babin, and R. E. 
Anderson, Multivariate data analysis: a global 
perspective. Pearson Education, 2010. 
[44] L. E. Pilli and J. A. Mazzon, “Information 
overload, choice deferral, and moderating role 
of need for cognition: Empirical evidence,” Rev. 
Adm., vol. 51, no. 1, pp. 036–055, 2016. 
 
Page 4424
